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During the Civil War
Abstract
For the majority of the Civil War, Canadians were divided in their loyalties to the Union and to the South.
However, in 1864, after years of sending agents and conspirators into Canada, the South became bolder
in their affairs north of the border. These efforts culminated into two attacks, planned and executed from
Canada by the South: The seizing of the Philo Parsons on Lake Erie on September 19, 1864; and the raid
on St. Albans, Vermont, a month later, on October 19, 1864. These two attacks forced Canada and Great
Britain to reassess their neutrality and, under pressure from the Union, Canada had to adopt more
stringent neutrality laws. Canada also lost its nearly unfettered access to the much-needed American
market when the Union cancelled the Reciprocity Treaty in early 1865.
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“GOOD NEIGHBOURHOOD”:
CANADA AND AMERICA’S CONTENTIOUS
RELATIONSHIP DURING THE CIVIL WAR
Michael R. D. Connolly | University of Ottawa
On May 30, 1867, Jefferson Davis, former president of the
Confederate States of America, arrived in Toronto following
his imprisonment after the Civil War. “I thank you for the
honour you have shown me,” he exclaimed to the crowd that
had gathered to welcome him for his five-month visit; “May
peace and prosperity be forever the blessing of Canada, for
she has been the asylum of many of my friends, as she is now
an asylum for myself… May God bless you all.” 1
During the Civil War, Canada became a safe haven
for Americans on either side of the Mason-Dixon line. Draftdodgers, refugees, traitors, diplomats, and agitators all made
the Province their home for a multitude of reasons. Yet while
both Northern and Southern agents spent their efforts spying
on each other and reporting intelligence back to their
respective capitals, the Confederacy accomplished far more
in Canada than the Union. In 1864, after years of courting
politicians in Great Britain as well as Canada, Confederates
decided to push their luck from across the northern border.
Their planning culminated in two attacks executed from
Canada: The seizure of the Philo Parsons on Lake Erie on
September 19, 1864, and the raid on St. Albans, Vermont in
Adam Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion: Canada, the Confederacy, and
the War for the Union (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2003), 20.
1
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the following month. These attacks forced Great Britain to
reassess its neutrality and Canada to adopt more stringent
neutrality laws under pressure from the Union. They
damaged the Confederacy’s image in turn among Canadians
who had previously been hospitable to Southern partisans,
with figures such as Clement Vallandigham—an anti-war
Democrat exiled from the North and then deported from the
South—earlier finding refuge in Ontario. But the impact of
the raids was far from universal, and many Canadians
continued to hope for a Confederate victory well into the
final year of the war. This article examines how and why so
many Southerners, all the way up to Jefferson Davis, found
their way in Canada during the and after the American Civil
War.
Canadian Considerations
The Civil War coincided with a growing sense of Canadian
national identity. 2 Accordingly, attitudes toward the war
centred around three primary issues: The prospect of a
stronger Canada when faced with a divided America; the
morality of slavery; and republicanism as an alternative
political structure. As historian Sydney F. Wise put it, most
In 1841, British possessions in North America were merged into the
Province of Canada, consisting of Canada West (also known as Upper
Canada, or Ontario) and Canada East (also known as Lower Canada, or
Quebec). Due in part to the conditions created by the American Civil
War, the 1860s saw increased calls for the United Canadas to join with
other British colonies in a single Canadian Confederation, governed by
one Parliament and colonial administration. The Province merged with
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick into the Dominion of Canada on July
1, 1867, laying the foundations for the modern Canadian state.
2
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Canadians were not “pro-North” or “pro-South,” but rather
“anti-North” or “anti-South.” 3 From the American Revolution onward, the United States posed a constant threat to
Canada, its territory, and its parliamentary democracy. This
was a fact widely recognized by colonists and Britons alike.
For many Canadians, it was clear that a strong Union was
more likely to attack its northern neighbour than a divided
one. Moreover, the British government believed that by
inclining its sympathies toward the South—through the
buying and selling of contraband, the harbouring of
fugitives, and diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy—
it might be able to prevent Canada from falling victim to the
doctrine of Manifest Destiny. 4
Given these considerations, Canadian politicians
greeted the outbreak of war with some enthusiasm. In 1861,
Joint Premier of the Province of Canada John A. Macdonald 5
expressed his belief that the South would gain independence
from the United States: “If they [Americans] are to be
Sydney F. Wise, God’s Peculiar Peoples: Essays on Political Culture
in Nineteenth Century Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press,
1993), 138.
4
George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations
since 1776, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017),
217-21.
5
From its formation in 1841, the Province of Canada was governed by a
Parliament with equal representation from Canada West and Canada
East; this is the legislature referenced throughout this paper. Each
region’s delegation was headed by a Premier, with the two men working
in tandem as joint heads of government. John A. Macdonald served as
Joint Premier from Canada West from 1856 to 1862 and again from 1864
to 1867. Upon Confederation, the Provincial legislature was replaced
with the modern-day Parliament and Macdonald became Canada’s first
prime minister.
3
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severed in two, as severed I believe they will be, they will be
two great, two noble, two free nations [that] will exist in the
place of one.” 6 Thomas D’Arcy McGee, Macdonald’s ally
in Parliament and a fellow Conservative, voiced much the
same sentiment in an 1863 letter to the Toronto Globe: “If
stability be essential to good government, [the United States]
have not had stability, and therefore, their description of
government cannot be good either for themselves or for
others.” 7
In Macdonald and McGee’s view, the United States
was doomed because it had failed to create a stable
government like that of Great Britain. American institutions,
from Congress to the presidency, lent inherent instability to
the state. Further, by changing its head of state so frequently
(prior to the Civil War, the United States had not had a twoterm president since Andrew Jackson three decades earlier),
the US government was unable to settle its affairs before
another president from another party could take power with
a new set of policies, patrons, and cabinet appointments.
With a change in administration every four years from 1837
to 1861, it is easy to understand why Macdonald and McGee
thought the United States was not built for longevity. For
these men, the Civil War was but the natural outgrowth of
republican democracy.
George Brown, an adversary of Macdonald’s in the
liberal Reform movement and founding editor of The Globe,
Richard J. Gwyn, John A: The Man Who Made Us (Toronto: Random
House Canada, 2007), 245.
7
Thomas D’Arcy McGee, “Letter From the Hon. Mr. McGee: A Fair
Trial for the Monarchical Principle,” The Globe (Toronto), July 6, 1863.
6
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was of a similar mind. In an article from 1849, Brown
attacked the United States for its preservation of slavery and
Canadian annexationists for their desire to join the failing
republic: “We turn… to this side of the Atlantic and ask what
has the great and swelling Republic of the United States done
for Freedom? We answer—nothing. We say it has gone back
since it started into existence from its connexion with
England.” 8 An ardent abolitionist, Brown believed that
America’s failure stemmed not from its republican
institutions per se, but because it had failed to end slavery
like Great Britain had done in the early nineteenth century.
He was Garrisonian in his condemnation:
It is difficult to believe that the Government will be
perpetually on the side of freedom, when the very
preservation of that unholy bond, the Union, is based
on the principle that in vast tracts of their country the
human mind is placed under Russian restraint, that it
is death in some places to teach children to read if
they have a drop of coloured blood in their veins; that
for a man to speak of freedom is imprisonment or
possibly death from a lawless mob… They have
maintained their own rights as the Emperors of
Russia and Austria maintain theirs, but they have as
little regard for liberty or the rights of others as these
tyrants have. 9
George Brown, “What Has Republicanism Done for Freedom?” The
Globe (Toronto), December 6, 1849.
9
Brown, “What Has Republicanism Done for Freedom?”
8
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Brown detested America for its hypocrisy. The United States
styled itself as the land of liberty, yet continued to preserve
slavery and even expand it throughout the continent. It laid
claim to liberalism, and while it had a democracy in name,
its ruling elite harboured similar attitudes toward the lower
classes as European autocrats.
Brown’s hatred of slavery inclined him to support the
Union when the war broke out, but he remained distrustful
of the North’s republican tradition. Macdonald and McGee,
for their part, were far more concerned for Canada and its
future than the liberty of American slaves. In July 1861,
Conservatives in Parliament cheered the Confederate victory
at the First Battle of Bull Run until they were angrily
silenced by Macdonald, as he understood the British
government’s need for strict neutrality. 10 Yet sympathies for
the South did not break along party lines; there were also a
number of Liberals who expressed support for the
Confederacy. Malcolm Colin Cameron, a Liberal politician
from Ontario, stated in 1865 that “he had no hesitation in
declaring that his feeling and sympathy were more aroused
by the manly and brave fight the people of the Southern
States were making for their independence, than by the
attempts of the North to put them down.” This remark came
while debating an immigration bill before Parliament.
Brown responded by contrasting Cameron’s love of British

10

Gwyn, John A, 245.
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freedom and his “sympathy with those who were fighting to
keep 4,000,000 slaves in bondage.” 11
In short, Canadian feelings toward the Civil War
were consistently mixed. As they argued over what shape
their own country would take throughout the 1860s, many
Canadians held an independent South to be in the national
interest. A successful rebellion would prove the United
States a failed experiment, demonstrating the rightfulness of
Canada’s place in the British Empire to annexationists. For
others, such as George Brown, a Confederate victory would
spell doom for the millions of enslaved people south of the
Mason-Dixon. While supportive of the Union effort, it is
important to remember that Canadian abolitionists were
often as hostile to republicanism as their pro-Southern
counterparts. Following in the longer tradition of British
abolitionism, they forcefully opposed slavery without
questioning Canada’s broader political constitution.
Rebels in the Great White North
Divided attitudes toward the war did not prevent Canada
from sheltering one of the Union’s best-known Southern
partisans. Congressman Clement Vallandigham was a
notorious Peace Democrat who, having lost his re-election
to the House after Republicans in the Ohio state legislature
gerrymandered his district, was arrested for delivering an
anti-Lincoln speech and exiled to the Confederacy in the
“Our Relations with Canada: Interesting Debate in the Provincial
Parliament. The Alien Bill upon its Second Reading,” The New York
Times, February 3, 1865.
11
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summer of 1863. 12 However, he was equally unwanted in the
South. Diarist Mary Boykin Chesnut thought Vallandigham
useless to the Southern cause, writing on July 8, 1863 that “I
am sure we could not trust him to do us any good, or to do
the Yankees any harm. The Coriolanus business is played
out.” 13 Referencing Shakespeare’s tragedy, Chesnut
believed Vallandigham had outlived his usefulness the
moment he lost his seat in Congress.
Realizing the dearth of political prospects in the
South, and sure that he would be killed if he returned to the
Union, Vallandigham was more than happy when Jefferson
Davis “ordered the Confederacy’s problematic guest to be
escorted to Wilmington, North Carolina, where he could
board a blockade runner bound for neutral British
territory.” 14 According to historian Robin Winks, Vallandigham was “fêted” at a “public dinner in Montreal” upon
arrival in Canada in July 1863. He was visited by a number
of elite Canadians, including William Walker, manager of
the Grand Trunk Railway, as well as Governor Alexander
Dallas of Rupert’s Land and Premier Macdonald himself.
Vallandigham was even introduced on the floor of the
Parliament by Thomas D’Arcy McGee. 15 Given the
Southern sympathies of many in government (see above),
Fergus M. Bordewich, Congress at War: How Republican Reformers
Fought the Civil War, Defied Lincoln, Ended Slavery, and Remade
America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 173.
13
Mary Boykin Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie (New York: D. Appleton
& Company, 1905), 216.
14
Bordewich, Congress at War, 231.
15
Robin Winks, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years
(Montreal: Harvest House, 1971), 143.
12
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Canadian Tories were more than willing to accommodate
their Copperhead visitor. While he had been worthless to the
Confederacy while in exile there, from Canada Vallandigham was able to forward his political agenda and launch
a bid for governor of Ohio.
Once settled, Vallandigham ran his gubernatorial
campaign from Windsor, Ontario, just across the river from
Detroit. He was assisted by Jacob Thompson, former United
States Secretary of the Interior and Inspector General of the
Confederate States Army, who was sent to Canada as a
leader of the Confederate Secret Service. Thompson offered
logistical support from the Confederate government. In turn,
Vallandigham offered information regarding public opinion
toward the war in the Union, however skewed his own
perspective may have been. Thompson even offered money
and arms to spark a Copperhead uprising in the Midwest 16
after Vallandigham insisted that a “feeling of fatigue and
rising anger had been building in the North following the
staggering casualties at Gettysburg.” He believed that with
only a slight push, “an uprising in the Midwest would create
a second confederacy and end the war.” 17 None of this was
true. But whether he had received inaccurate information or
had simply misread the results of the 1862-63 midterm
elections, Vallandigham, in a direct attack on British
neutrality, was working to incite violence in the United
States.
Cathryn J. Prince, Burn the Town and Sack the Banks: Confederates
Attack Vermont! (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006), 116.
17
Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion, 28.
16
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Both Canadian and American authorities, well aware
of the comings and goings of Confederate agents in Canada,
kept a close eye on Vallandigham. Rumours circulated
throughout the Union that Vallandigham was “conniving”
with Canadians and Confederates “to let an armed steamer
pass through the Welland Canal” into New York; the
Rochester Evening Express further suggested that a
“Canadian Gunboat” was “on the way to burn Sandusky
[Ohio],” a city on the shores of Lake Erie. 18 Though false,
these rumours damaged Canada’s credibility in the eyes of
many Northerners. The fact that Canada was known to
harbour Southern fugitives and agents—and especially that
it hosted the likes of Vallandigham in a town where he could
see Detroit from his bedroom window—did not endear
Northerners to their foreign neighbours.
The Union’s fears were almost realized from across
the northern border on September 19, 1864. That night, a
Virginian named John Yates Beall, Captain Charles H. Cole
of the Confederate Army, and a group of around thirty
Southern sympathizers attempted to free the Confederate
soldiers held on Johnson’s Island, which housed a prison
camp three miles off Sandusky Bay, Ohio. Organized in
Canada, the plan was fairly straightforward. Cole was to
prevail upon the captain of the USS Michigan, an ironclad
warship stationed in Sandusky, to drug and subdue the ship’s
crew. Then Beall and his company would steal a ferry (the
steamship Philo Parsons), regroup with Cole, overtake the
Michigan, turn its guns on Johnson’s Island, and liberate the
18

Winks, Canada and the United States, 148.
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camp’s 2,500 Confederate prisoners. Finally, they would
organize the soldiers into a small army and ravage the
Midwest, 19 although how exactly the conspirators intended
to lead thousands of “sick, injured, and malnourished
officers” was never fully explained. 20 But the raid did not go
as planned, as the captain and crew of the Michigan caught
on to Cole’s act fairly quickly. By the time Beall and his
compatriots had arrived at Sandusky on the Philo Parsons,
it was clear that Cole had not fulfilled his part of the mission.
The crew returned to Windsor and scuttled the ferry. In their
haste, however, Beall had broken British neutrality law by
stealing baggage and arms from the Philo Parsons’
passengers, as well as the ship’s piano and one hundred
dollars belonging to the ship’s captain. Because the
conspirators had robbed the ship and violated Britain’s
neutrality, Canada was able to extradite them to the United
States on charges of robbery. 21
The Canadian press was outraged by the attack. Even
traditionally pro-Southern newspapers such as the Toronto
Leader believed that the raiders had “abused Canadian
hospitality” in their commandeering of the Philo Parsons. 22
The colonial government was equally incensed. Governor
General Charles Monck, who had urged Parliament to
increase firepower on the Great Lakes earlier in the war,
feared what the plot might spell for British neutrality. 23
Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion, 28.
Winks, Canada and the United States, 288.
21
Winks, Canada and the United States, 290.
22
Winks, Canada and the United States, 290-91.
23
Prince, Burn the Town and Sack the Banks, 90.
19
20
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Monck wanted to ensure Canada’s ability to thwart any
future Southern incursions, requesting greater legal authority
from Westminster to “seize vessels and munitions on the
lakes, including the incendiary materials used by the rebels
to fire on American cities.” He also sought the authority to
expel anyone suspected of violating British neutrality, or at
least to imprison them, in his language, on charges of
“levying war from Her Majesty’s Dominions against a
friendly power.” 24
Monck knew that there was a greater problem at
hand: that his government had been unable to track the
actions of Southern agents in Canada. He was aware that
spies and agitators were operating in the country, but had
been promised by agent James Holcombe in May 1864 that
the Confederacy “did not plan any hostile acts from
Canadian soil,” and that its actors “would not violate any
local or Imperial laws.” 25 By September of the same year, it
was obvious that Monck could not trust what Confederate
agents had told him.
At the same time as the Philo Parsons incident, the
Confederacy was steadily losing control of its own territory.
Generals Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman
had already pushed deep into the heart of the South (Union
forces entered Atlanta just two weeks before the Sandusky
raid), and the upcoming presidential election in November
meant that Confederates needed to do whatever they could
to terrorize pro-Union voters and embolden Copperhead
24
25

Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion, 90.
Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion, 35.
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Democrats. While sliding autumn temperatures made
another naval attack from Canada unlikely, the Union was
forced to temporarily withdraw from the Rush-Bagot
Treaty—a naval disarmament pact between the United
States and Britain signed after the War of 1812—and
reinforce the Great Lakes out of precaution. 26 As the Union
believed Great Britain to be failing its promise of neutrality
and knew that many powerful Canadians harboured
Southern sympathies out of self-interest, this move only
worked to heighten diplomatic tensions.
Northerners were still reeling from the raid on Lake
Erie when they learned of a second incursion from across the
border. This time, however, the consequences would be far
greater. The raid on St. Albans, Vermont occurred on
October 19, 1864, exactly one month after the Philo Parsons
incident and the same day as a decisive Union victory at the
Battle of Cedar Creek. In the days leading up to the attack,
Southern agents arrived in the small trading town just south
of the border with Quebec. Posing as Canadians in a hunting
club, 27 the men went practically unnoticed by the locals, who
“never paid much heed to the comings and goings of
strangers,” as they were accustomed to traders and travelers
frequenting their town. 28 At three o’clock in the afternoon
on October 19, a twenty-one-year-old Kentuckian named
Bennett Young, who had previously served with the expert
Confederate raider John Hunt Morgan, 29 stepped out onto
Winks, Canada and the United States, 293.
Winks, Canada and the United States, 298.
28
Prince, Burn the Town and Sack the Banks, 126.
29
Prince, Burn the Town and Sack the Banks, 124.
26
27
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his hotel’s front porch, waved his Navy Colt revolver in the
air and loudly proclaimed: “In the name of the Confederate
States, I take possession of St. Albans!” 30
Young and his band proceeded to sack the three
banks of St. Albans, stealing horses and weapons in the name
of the Confederacy. Aware of the problems that had hindered
the Philo Parson affair, Robin Winks writes that Young “had
instructed his men clearly to stamp the raid as an act of war,
but despite his own announcement from the hotel porch, his
followers left themselves open to serious charges by the way
in which they identified themselves.” 31 The raid itself lasted
only a few hours but left a devastating psychological impact
on the inhabitants of St. Albans. The goal was not to rape
and pillage, but to strike fear into the hearts of Northerners
and give them a taste of what Southerners were feeling at the
same time. As one of the raiders put it:
I wish to say that killing women and children was the
last thing thought of. We wanted to let the North
understand that there were two sides to this war, and
that they can’t be rolling in wealth and comfort,
while we in the South are bearing all the hardships
and privations. In retaliation for [General Philip H.]
Sheridan’s atrocities in the Shenandoah Valley, we
desired to destroy property, not the lives of women

30
31

Winks, Canada and the United States, 299.
Winks, Canada and the United States, 299.
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and children, although that would, of course, have
followed in its train. 32
Today these actions would be labeled as terrorism, but in the
context of nineteenth-century warfare, they were understood
as revenge. The raiders were keenly aware that if Southern
attacks in other areas were as successful as they had been in
Vermont, if the Philo Parsons plot had gone off as planned,
if Confederates had a proper army to invade the Union from
Canada, then they could copy the scorched-earth tactics that
Northern forces were using in their homelands.
At the raid’s conclusion, the agents rushed back
across the Canadian border, followed by a posse of
townspeople from St. Albans. Though they failed to capture
most of the attackers, the pursuers did get a hold of Young
after crossing into Quebec. But the St. Albans men, with
Young in tow, were stopped by a British officer, who
informed them that they were in violation of Canadian
neutrality. The soldier then took Young to join the other
raiders, who had already been apprehended by British
forces. 33
Canadians were swift to condemn the raid. An article
in The Globe, printed two days after the attack, protested that
“Our country affords an asylum for thousands of Southern
refugees, and it would be most infamous for the Confederate
government to send men here commissioned to plunder our
neighbours with whom we are at peace.” The author also
32
33

Prince, Burn the Town and Sack the Banks, 129.
Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion, 110.
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hoped that “the Confederate robbers were acting upon their
own responsibility” rather than on orders from the
government. 34 Canadians had every reason to be outraged:
they had opened their doors to Southerners who, in turn,
stabbed them in the back whenever it became convenient.
The Confederates were also in a difficult position. By
October 1864, with William Tecumseh Sherman fighting
through Georgia and Philip Sheridan’s Valley campaign
brought to a successful conclusion in Virginia, the tide had
shifted in the Union’s favour. It was clear that the
Confederacy would need to turn to increasingly drastic
actions, even if it meant provoking a friendly nation like
Great Britain.
Yet no nation was so provoked as the Union.
Secretary of State William Seward believed that Canadians
“were not displaying ‘good neighbourhood’ in permitting
such raids to be planned in their midst.” 35 For Seward,
Canada was responsible for the Confederate agents in its
territory, whose conduct “might endanger peace with
Canada.” Seward’s feelings were not helped by the fact that,
during his trial, Bennett Young claimed that he was sent to
Canada “as a commissioned officer in the provisional army
of the Confederate States and that he had violated no law of
Canada.” 36 Young contended that the raid was not planned
in Canada and therefore did not violate British neutrality. 37
“The St. Albans Raid,” The Globe, October 22, 1864.
Winks, Canada and the United States, 303.
36
James Morton Callahan, The Diplomatic History of the Southern
Confederacy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 235.
37
Prince, Burn the Town and Sack the Banks, 204.
34
35
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But the Union took the matter seriously, and was compelled
to take diplomatic action in response.
Wars and Rumours of Wars
In his annual address to Congress on December 6, 1864,
President Abraham Lincoln discussed the situation with
Canada. He brought forward his recommendations for
retaliatory action against the Province:
In view of the insecurity of life and property in the
region adjacent to the Canadian border, by reason of
recent assaults and depredations committed by
inimical and desperate persons who are harbored
there, it has been thought proper to give notice that
after the expiration of six months… the United States
must hold themselves at liberty to increase their
naval armaments upon the lakes… The condition of
the border will necessarily come into consideration
in connection with the questions of continuing or
modifying the rights of transit from Canada through
the United States, as well as the regulation of
imposts, which were temporarily established by the
Reciprocity Treaty of the 5th of June, 1854. 38
The Reciprocity Treaty had eliminated customs tariffs
between the United States and Canada, creating an economic
Abraham Lincoln, “Annual Message to Congress,” in The Civil War:
The Final Year Told by Those Who Lived It, ed. Aaron Sheehan-Dean
(New York: Library of America, 2014), 497.
38
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boom north of the border. The prospect of its revocation
would deprive Canada of one of its most lucrative trading
markets and force it to rely more heavily on Great Britain for
imports.
Lincoln maintained that “the colonial authorities of
Canada are not deemed to be intentionally unjust or
unfriendly towards the United States… there is every reason
to expect that… they will take the necessary measures to
prevent new incursions across the border.” 39 He was not
looking to attack Canada, but to prod Canadians into doing
what he wanted of them: stop Confederate agents from
working in the country and draft stronger neutrality
legislation. He was also aware of the economic damage he
could inflict to leverage his hand. An article from the New
York Albion on December 17 questioned Lincoln’s ability to
abrogate the Reciprocity Treaty and criticized his
administration for failing to protect the Union: “The
termination of the Reciprocity Treaty appears likely to pass
both Houses [of Congress] at a gallop. Yet it is by no means
certain that the Executive will be in a hurry to act in this
manner… it does not desire to quarrel with the North West,
whose interests lie [in the continuance of the Treaty].” 40 In
other words, Lincoln needed to pay heed to the Old
Northwest (known today as the Upper Midwest), where
many Copperheads remained influential and where the
Reciprocity Treaty was seen as an economic benefit. Yet in
Lincoln, “Annual Message to Congress,” 497.
“The St. Albans’ Raiders: A Canadian Difficulty,” The Albion: A
Journal of News, Politics and Literature (New York), December 17,
1864.

39
40
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the time between Lincoln’s address to Congress on
December 6 and the Albion article from December 17, the
judge presiding over the St. Albans case in Canada had
handed down a ruling that further enraged the Northern
public.
On December 13, 1864, after more than a month of
hearings, Judge Charles-Joseph Coursol ruled that he lacked
a warrant from the Governor General and that no machinery
for extradition existed under the Webster-Ashburton Treaty
of 1842. 41 “Consequently,” he said, “I am bound in law,
justice and fairness to order the immediate release of the
prisoners upon all charges brought before me. Let the
prisoners be discharged.” 42 Needless to say, this was a result
that neither Canada nor the Union was hoping for. On
December 14, the United States Senate passed two
resolutions condemning the ruling, and on the same day
Governor General Monck stated that the ruling was absurd
and ordered that the raiders be re-arrested. 43 He also urged
the government to investigate Coursol for any possible
misconduct. 44 Further, on December 17, the US State
Department issued the passport controls that Lincoln had
threatened in his message to Congress, bringing cross-border
traffic to a halt. 45 In the span of just four months, Southern
agents in Canada had gone from refugees to unwelcome
guests, and Anglo-American relations from strained to
Winks, Canada and the United States, 313.
Prince, Burn the Town and Sack the Banks, 211.
43
Prince, Burn the Town and Sack the Banks, 214.
44
Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion, 176.
45
Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion, 190.
41
42
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nearly broken. The raiders were indeed re-arrested following
Monck’s order and put on trial with a different judge, but the
damage was already done.
From late December 1864 to April 1865, the threat
of war loomed over Canada and Great Britain like the sword
of Damocles. One newspaper referred to the threat of
invasion as “a war in anticipation” with the Union. 46 As the
United States maintained a strong professional army that had
been fighting for over four years, it was doubtful that Canada
would remain in British hands were war to break out. For
Confederates, a war between Britain and the Union would
be a best-case scenario, as they believed the North would be
unable to fight a two-front war. A clerk in the Confederate
War Department wrote that “A war with England would be
our peace,” and the diarist George Templeton Strong
believed that a military reaction to Coursol’s ruling “would
be an inducement for Confederates to repeat the [St. Albans]
raid” to push the North into war. 47 Canadian and British
media began to turn even more strongly against the South.
The Telegraph from Saint John, New Brunswick claimed
that “the Confederacy was abusing provincial hospitality in
order to embroil Great Britain in war with the United
States.” 48 The Globe insisted in March 1865 that “There
could be but one object in these acts—if at all acts of war—
and that would be to occasion war between England and the
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United States, as such alone could aid their [Confederate]
cause.” 49
Even as General Grant neared Richmond, the
Confederacy had a newfound confidence on the world stage.
The St. Albans raid had worked spectacularly to incite the
Union’s anger against its colonial neighbour, and Canada’s
neutrality laws had given Southern agents a chance at
freedom. Yet as Robin Winks has written, “Any satisfaction
gained in the South by the daring that the raiders displayed
was more than offset by the feeling created in the Canadas
that the Confederacy had abused British hospitality… Even
papers that had been highly sympathetic to the South, like
the Montreal Evening Telegram and the Toronto Leader,
deplored the acts of ‘the brigands.’” 50
The raids destroyed any remaining credibility the
Confederacy may have had in Canada as the fear of war and
annexation by the United States increased. Addressing
Parliament in February 1865, John A. Macdonald decried
“those who had come to make use of our country as the base
of operations against the United States, and to induce if
possible a war between Great Britain and the United
States.” 51 Despite his well-known Southern sympathies,
Macdonald was forced to move against the Confederacy to
preserve peace with the Union. Even Lord Palmerston,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, acknowledged that
the North should be allowed to voice its displeasure. In order
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to avoid “an angry debate” between the two nations,
Palmerston recognized that “things did take place of which
the United States were justly entitled to complain.” 52 To
pacify the Union, both Canada and Britain needed to ensure
that another St. Albans would never happen again—and if it
did, that its perpetrators could be extradited. In short, they
needed to adopt more stringent neutrality laws.
Though it remained officially neutral throughout, the
British government’s attitude toward the war had ebbed and
flowed with the tide of Southern military fortunes. By 1865
it was confident of a Union victory—and while there were
“many well-wishers both to the North and South” in Britain,
popular opinion as the war neared its end was summed up in
The Times of London: The Union and Confederacy “entered
into this ill-advised quarrel without consulting us; we wish
that they would put an end to it under the same conditions.” 53
This article was reprinted in the Toronto Globe, indicating
that it spoke for many Canadians as well. Britons had simply
grown tired of the war; they had lent assistance to the South
when it suited them, but now were ready for the drama to be
over with. War weariness was a sentiment understandably
shared by the Northern public as well.
In February 1865, Canada’s Parliament finally
passed a revised neutrality law in the hopes of preventing an
Anglo-American conflict. The bill, dubbed the Alien Act,
had three primary components. First, it enabled the Canadian
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government “to remove from this country aliens who are
coming here and seeking an asylum in consequence of war,
who may have in their own land by their conduct, proved
themselves unworthy of that asylum.” It then cited the
Neutrality Act, first ratified by the United States Congress in
1794 and updated in 1838, as an example of American
legislation “prevent[ing] incursions into Canada.” Finally,
the bill expressed its “purpose of requiring persons
manufacturing arms and munitions of war, which might be
suspected to be intended to be used in hostilities against the
United States, to give an account of them.” 54 The chief goal
of the Alien Act was to lessen friction with the United States,
and in that it can be counted as a success. Its invocation of
the Neutrality Act as a reminder of friendly relations in the
past had even come at the suggestion of Secretary Seward. 55
The Conservative government, however, was not so
willing to acknowledge American pressure. In Parliament
Macdonald asserted that the act “had been initiated entirely
at the suggestion of the Canadian Government, and not from
any declaration, suggestion, and so much as expression of
desire on the part of the United States Government to have
such legislation.” George Brown repeated the claim on the
floor of Parliament, adding that “he supported the bill, not as
a partisan of North or South, but as a citizen of Canada,
anxious to preserve the peace of the country, and prevent war
between Great Britain and the United States.” 56 But it was
“Our Relations with Canada.”
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obvious that the Alien Act had indeed been drafted at the
North’s insistence. As a matter of course, it also enumerated
the extradition powers that Governor General Monck had
earlier requested from London. 57 Although these powers
came too late for Monck, they were part of Canada and
Britain’s efforts to maintain good relations with the United
States no matter the outcome of the Civil War. Most
pointedly, the act denied Confederates the ability to wage
their guerilla war from across the Canadian border. Yet by
the time it passed through Parliament, Sherman’s March to
the Sea had moved into the Carolinas and the Siege of
Petersburg was well underway. The South had already lost.
Ottawa and Appomattox
Unfortunately for Canada, the Union was not as forgiving as
it would have liked. Despite Parliament’s appeals to the
Northern government, the United States was unwilling to
renew the Reciprocity Treaty. In a letter to British politician
John Bright written less than a month before Lee’s surrender,
Senator Charles Sumner (R-MA) stated the following:
I came into the proposition to give the notice to
terminate the Reciprocity Treaty, because I was
satisfied that we could not negotiate for its modification, on a footing of equality unless our hands were
untied… Congress has separated in good humor,
without anxiety for the future, & indeed confident
that we are on the verge of peace. My desire is that
57
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England should do something to take out the bitterness from the American heart—before the war
closes. 58
Sumner was not opposed to continuing the Reciprocity
Treaty, but the Philo Parsons incident, the attack on St.
Albans, and the harbouring of Southern refugees did not
endear the senator to Canada. While he lacked an appetite
for armed confrontation after years of bloodshed, he wanted
more than the steps already taken in the Alien Act.
Canada did attempt to “take out the bitterness from
the American heart.” The Montreal Telegraph Company
offered to work with the Union by diverting Confederate
messages to Washington, but the State Department refused;
according to Seward, the offer was “incompatible with the
self respect of the U.S.” 59 The Canadian government also
proposed financial restitution for the raid on St. Albans. This
effort was more successful than initiatives from the private
sector. In April 1865, the government paid a sum of $60,000
to the three banks of St. Albans in compensation for the
money stolen during the attack. 60 Thus the crisis in
Canadian-American relations was brought to a close at the
same time as the Civil War—even though the Confederacy
bore most of the responsibility for the diplomatic nadir.
Canada had demonstrated its willingness to meet
American demands in the form of neutrality legislation,
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intelligence exchange, and cash. Yet the United States never
reinstated the Reciprocity Treaty, which had done so much
to grow Canada’s economy during its short lifespan. Indeed,
the Civil War would impact Anglo- and Canadian-American
relations for decades to come. Canada’s initial sympathies
toward the South provided Confederates with a base for
intelligence operations and guerilla warfare. Moreover, its
willingness to accommodate other Southern sympathizers
like Clement Vallandigham damaged Canada’s relationship
with the Union, and allowed Confederate agents to feel
welcome enough to abuse British hospitality for their own
benefit. The Philo Parsons affair and the St. Albans raid
showed Canadians that many of their Southern guests were
not mere refugees, but hostile actors conspiring against their
closest neighbour. Canada’s deficient neutrality laws pushed
Great Britain and the Union closer to war, which would have
been of significant benefit to the Confederacy. All of this led
to a weakened Canadian economy and restrictions on the
free movement of people and goods between Canada and the
United States both during and after the Civil War. These
conditions led in no small part to Canadian Confederation in
1867 and the foundation of the modern Canadian state.
Canadians were charmed by Confederates. Their
charisma and aristocratic ways were similar to those of the
English. Anti-Americanism further allowed Canadians to be
fooled into a tacit support for Southern agents within their
borders, hoping that a fractured Union would lead to a
stronger British Empire. What resulted was a plate full of
crow for Canada.
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